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Bence Nanay 
Hallucination 
as Mental Imagery 
Abstract: Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of 
perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is 
treated marks an important stance in one of the most hotly contested 
debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between ‘relationalists’ and 
‘representationalists’. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a 
form of mental imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychia-
try routinely does), then we have a very straightforward way of argu-
ing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form of mental imagery 
and if mental imagery and perception have some substantive common 
denominator, then a fortiori, perception and hallucination will also 
have a substantive common denominator. 
1. Introduction 
A simple way of summarizing the debate between ‘representa-
tionalists’ and ‘relationalists’ is the following. Representationalists 
take perceptual states to be representations: perceptual states represent 
the world as being a certain way. This representation may or may not 
be correct. One way in which it can be incorrect is if we are hallucina-
ting. Relationalists deny that perceptual states are representations: 
they argue that perceptual states are partly constituted by the per-
ceived object. But, if this is so, then hallucinations (where there are no 
perceived objects) are radically different from veridical perceptual 
states (Brewer, 2011; Martin, 2004; Campbell, 2002). 
So one way of contrasting representationalist and relationalist 
accounts of perception is to ask what veridical perception (the good 
case — when things go well) and hallucination (the bad case — when 
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things go wrong) have in common. Representationalists say they have 
an awful lot in common: they are mental states of the same kind, it’s 
just that one of them (veridical perception) is correct, whereas the 
other one (hallucination) is not. But relationalists say they do not have 
much in common. 
In fact, one influential brand of relationalism, namely, disjuncti-
vism, makes this attribute of some relationalist theories explicit 
already in its name.1 But more care is required to be clear about what 
it is that disjunctivists deny: they do not deny that veridical perception 
and hallucination have anything in common. They clearly have a lot in 
common — they are both mental states, for example. And they can 
have very similar phenomenal character. What disjunctivism denies is 
that veridical perception and hallucination have anything substantial in 
common — whatever substantial means (see Nanay, 2015b, for an 
analysis of the essentialist assumptions behind this way of thinking 
about disjunctivism). 
I will argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental 
imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychiatry routinely 
does, see below), then we have a very straightforward way of arguing 
against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form of mental imagery and 
if mental imagery and perception have some substantive common 
denominator, then a fortiori perception and hallucination will also 
have a substantive common denominator. 
The structure of the paper is simple: in Section 2 and 3, I argue that 
hallucination is a form of mental imagery and, in Section 4, I argue 
that mental imagery and perception are similar in some important, 
substantive respects. I conclude on the basis of these two claims in 
Section 5 that hallucination and perception are not at all radically 
different (as disjunctivists argue). 
2. Mental Imagery 
Given that much of the argumentative structure of this paper depends 
on the concept of mental imagery, I need to say more about what I 
mean by this concept. It is important to emphasize that this paper is 
about mental imagery and not about imagination in general. There are 
many uses of the term ‘imagination’ and it is not easy to pin down 
                                                          
1  There are some further wrinkles: one can be relationalist without being disjunctivist and 
one can be disjunctivist while endorsing representationalism about veridical perception 
(see Pautz, 2010, for analysis). 
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what they are and how they differ. But what I want to focus on is not 
any of the senses of the term ‘imagination’, but the concept of mental 
imagery. Having mental imagery of an apple should be differentiated 
from imagining that there is an apple in the kitchen, an imagining 
episode which amounts to having a propositional attitude (see, for 
example, Kind, 2001; Gregory, 2010; 2014; Van Leeuwen, 2011).2 
And having mental imagery should not be confused with what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘sensory imagination’ either. Sensory 
imagination (e.g. imagining seeing something) is one way in which we 
can exercise our mental imagery, but not the only one. 
What is mental imagery then? A good starting point is the definition 
of mental imagery in Kosslyn and colleagues: 
Visual mental imagery is ‘seeing’ in the absence of the appropriate 
immediate sensory input, auditory mental imagery is ‘hearing’ in the 
absence of the immediate sensory input, and so on. Imagery is distinct 
from perception, which is the registration of physically present stimuli. 
(Kosslyn, Behrmann and Jeannerod, 1995, p. 1335) 
Another influential characterization of mental imagery comes from 
Roger Shepard: 
The relation of a mental image to its corresponding object is in some 
ways analogous to the relation of a lock to a key… the lock can be 
externally operated only by its corresponding key… It may also be 
possible to operate the lock, at least partially, by direct manipulation of 
its mechanism from the inside, in the absence of its external key. 
(Shepard, 1978, p. 130) 
These quotes are supposed to be representative of the way the concept 
of mental imagery is used in perceptual psychology. They are by no 
means cherry-picked. Here is the definition used in a very recent 
review article on mental imagery: ‘We use the term “mental imagery” 
to refer to representations… of sensory information without a direct 
external stimulus’ (Pearson et al., 2015). 
I take it that the way the concept of mental imagery is used in the 
empirical literature points in the direction of the following definition 
(which will be my definition of mental imagery in this paper): mental 
imagery is perceptual processing that is not triggered by corres-
ponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. By per-
ceptual processing I mean the kind of processing that also goes on in 
                                                          
2  Propositional imagination can, of course, also involve the exercise of mental imagery, 
so these two categories are not meant to be exclusive. 
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perception. Some philosophers are very precious about the term ‘per-
ception’: they take perception to presuppose not only the correspond-
ing sensory stimulation, but often also the existence and presence of 
the perceived object. I am not so precious. But if you are, then you can 
read ‘quasi-perceptual processing’ in lieu of ‘perceptual processing’ in 
the definition of mental imagery. By sensory stimulation, I mean the 
activation of our sensory organs, for example, light hitting our retina 
in the visual sense modality. An important advantage of using this 
empirically inspired definition is that it allows us to be neutral with 
regards to some features often attributed to some standard examples of 
mental imagery. 
Here is a standard example of mental imagery: close your eyes and 
visualize an apple. This (if you are successful) gives rise to the mental 
imagery of an apple. This is clearly one example of mental imagery, 
but in some ways a misleading, or at least unrepresentative, one. First, 
mental imagery is not necessarily visual: I use the term ‘mental 
imagery’ to cover visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc. imagery. 
Second and more importantly, the example of closing one’s eyes 
was an example of an active, intended, and voluntary act. But mental 
imagery can also be passive and neither intended nor voluntary. We 
can have mental imagery even if we are not trying to visualize any-
thing — when, for example, we are having involuntary flashbacks to 
some scene that we have seen earlier. This is especially clear in the 
auditory sense modality, as demonstrated by the phenomenon of ear-
worms: tunes that pop into our heads and that we keep on having 
auditory imagery of, even though we do not want to. Further, if mental 
imagery is a necessary feature of episodic memory (Byrne, Becker 
and Burgess, 2007; see also Berryhill et al.’s, 2007, overview), then it 
is also involuntary inasmuch as episodic memory can also be 
involuntary. 
Third, the example of closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple is 
somewhat atypical inasmuch as the apple I visualize with my eyes 
closed is likely to be in some abstract visualized space. But I can also 
visualize an apple in my egocentric space: I can visualize an apple to 
be right here on the keyboard of my laptop. Again, having mental 
imagery of something in our egocentric space is not something 
unusual — we use mental imagery this way very often. When you are 
looking at your empty living room, thinking about what kind of 
furniture to buy, you’re likely to try to form mental imagery of, say, a 
sofa not in an abstract space ‘in the mind’s eye’, but in your living 
room. And when you’re trying to figure out whether this sofa would 
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fit through the main entrance, again, you are having mental imagery of 
the sofa in the very concrete space of the main entrance of your house. 
Finally, I will assume that mental imagery, like most mental states, 
can be conscious or unconscious. Closing one’s eyes and visualizing 
an apple is clearly a conscious instance of mental imagery, but mental 
imagery can also be unconscious (see also Church, 2008, and Nanay, 
2010b, for some philosophical arguments; and Zeman et al., 2007, 
2010, 2015, for empirical support). Ian Phillips, for example, has 
argued that the reason why there is a significant variation in people’s 
reports on their use of imagery is not that some of them use imagery 
and others don’t, but that the imagery of some people tends to be 
conscious and the imagery of some others tends to be unconscious 
(Phillips, 2014). 
I expect some resistance at this point from those who insist that 
mental imagery is necessarily conscious. My response to this is that I 
want to follow the way vision scientists and perceptual psychologists 
use the term. Take the two definitions of mental imagery I quoted 
above: one from Kosslyn, Behrmann and Jeannerod and one from 
Shepard. Neither makes any reference to consciousness. And for good 
reasons. Take for example the famous mental rotation tasks, one of the 
most widely celebrated findings about mental imagery. There is linear 
correspondence between the time required for deciding whether two 
three-dimensional shapes are the same and the degree of rotation 
between these two shapes (Shepard and Metzler, 1971). Whatever 
these experiments say about mental imagery, they must say about 
mental imagery that it is not necessarily conscious as these experi-
ments are behavioural experiments and the reasons for inferring the 
exercise of mental imagery are not introspective ones but they come 
from the timing of the subjects’ responses. 
These three distinctions (conscious vs. unconscious, voluntary vs. 
involuntary, egocentric vs. non-egocentric) are orthogonal to one 
another: we can have conscious egocentric voluntary mental imagery, 
unconscious egocentric voluntary mental imagery, conscious ego-
centric involuntary mental imagery, and so on. 
I want to add a fourth distinction within the category of mental 
imagery. Mental imagery may or may not be accompanied by the 
feeling of presence. In the case of some standard examples of mental 
imagery, like closing one’s eyes and visualizing an apple, it is not. 
When you visualize the apple, you don’t have the feeling that it is 
right in front of you. But there is no reason why mental imagery 
couldn’t be accompanied by the feeling of presence (especially if we 
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take the feeling of presence to be a metacognitive feeling; see Dokic, 
this issue). The mental imagery that is involved in lucid dreaming, for 
example, is accompanied by the feeling of presence. Sometimes (but 
not always) mental imagery is accompanied by the feeling of 
presence. 
3. Hallucination 
What can we say about hallucination in the light of the discussion of 
mental imagery I gave in Section 2? Hallucinations would clearly 
count as mental imagery according to the account of mental imagery I 
outlined here. And indeed it would count as mental imagery according 
to most psychological definitions of mental imagery: it is perceptual 
processing that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation 
in the relevant sense modality. 
The psychiatry literature treats hallucination as a form of mental 
imagery (see Allen, 2015, esp. Section III, for a summary).3 Here is 
the official medical definition from the American Psychological 
Association’s Dictionary of Psychology: ‘a false sensory perception 
that has the compelling sense of reality despite the absence of an 
external stimulus’ (VandenBos, 2007, p. 427). If we think of halluci-
nation this way, it very clearly falls under the definitions of mental 
imagery in psychology I considered above (Kosslyn, Behrman and 
Jeannerod, 1995; Shepard, 1978; Pearson et al., 2015). Hallucination 
very much qualifies as ‘“seeing” in the absence of the appropriate 
immediate sensory input’ (as Kosslyn, Behrman and Jeannerod, 1995, 
would say). And it is also a representation ‘of sensory information 
without a direct external stimulus’ (as Pearson et al., 2015, would 
say).4 And it also fits my own definition: it is perceptual processing 
that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in the 
relevant sense modality. In fact, some psychologists define hallucina-
                                                          
3  Keith Allen’s paper (Allen, 2015) has an interesting relation to the argument I am 
proposing here. He argues, in the light of the empirical literature, that hallucination is a 
form of imagination. I argue that hallucination is a form of mental imagery (and as we 
have seen, mental imagery is to be distinguished from imagination). Further, his conclu-
sions are broadly ‘relationalist’, whereas mine are ‘representationalist’. 
4  The minority that consider hallucination to be different from mental imagery (see 
Ffytche, 2008) very clearly mean something else by mental imagery than I do (follow-
ing the psychological consensus). More precisely, Ffytche (2008) takes mental imagery 
to be necessarily voluntary and we have seen that this is a dubious and unmotivated 
assumption. 
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tion in ways that are eerily similar to my own definition of mental 
imagery: ‘a sensory experience which occurs in the absence of corres-
ponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ’ (David, 
2004, p. 108; see also Aleman and de Haan, 1998, p. 657, for a very 
similar definition; see also Aleman and Larøi, 2008, chapter 1, for a 
good overview on defining hallucination). Crucially, while hallucina-
tions form a very diverse set of mental phenomena, the early sensory 
cortices are activated in the vast majority of them (and in all sense 
modalities, see e.g. Henkin, Levy and Lin, 2000; see also Kompus, 
Westerhausen and Hugdahl, 2011, for a meta-analysis, and Allen et 
al., 2008, for a summary).5 
Hallucination is mental imagery that is conscious, involuntary, 
localizes egocentrically, and that is accompanied by the feeling of 
presence. While I want to allow for the fact that hallucination (like 
perception) can be unconscious, those cases of hallucination that are 
relevant for the disjunctivism debate are conscious. One way in which 
hallucinations seem very different from some paradigmatic cases of 
mental imagery is that they are involuntary, whereas visualizing an 
apple is a voluntary act. But as we have seen, voluntariness is an 
optional feature of mental imagery: mental imagery may or may not 
be voluntary. Hallucination (most of the time) also localizes its object 
in one’s egocentric space, but, again, as we have seen, so do many 
uses of mental imagery (as the example of imagining an apple stand-
ing on the keyboard of my laptop shows). Finally, one important hall-
mark of hallucinations is that they are accompanied by a very strong 
feeling of presence. That is the reason why it may be possible to con-
fuse hallucination with perception — both are accompanied by a 
strong feeling of presence. But as I argued above, the feeling of 
presence is an optional add-on when it comes to mental imagery. 
Some uses of mental imagery, like the visualizing of the apple, are not 
accompanied by the feeling of presence. But some others are. Halluci-
nations belong to the latter group. 
The conclusion is that both hallucinations and visualizing an apple 
with one’s eyes closed would count as bona fide instances of mental 
imagery. But they are very different kinds of mental imagery. While 
                                                          
5  What may constitute an exception is verbal hallucination in schizophrenia, which is 
allegedly brought about by activations of the parts of the brain that are responsible for 
inner speech (Frith and Done, 1988). But it is worth noting that these findings are 
consistent with activity in the primary auditory cortex (and there is some evidence that 
this is indeed so, see Jones and Fernyhough, 2007, and Kompus et al., 2013). 
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both are normally conscious, other than that they are diametrically 
opposed with regards to the other three distinctions I made within the 
category of mental imagery. Visualizing an apple with one’s eyes 
closed is voluntary, does not usually localize in one’s egocentric 
space, and is not accompanied by the feeling of presence. Hallucina-
tion, in contrast, is involuntary, localizes in one’s egocentric space, 
and is accompanied by the feeling of presence. 
A better parallel of the kind of mental imagery hallucination is 
would be the somewhat controversial case of amodal completion — of 
the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects, like the 
unseen parts of the cat behind the picket fence (Nanay, 2010b; 
Briscoe, 2011). If amodal completion is a form of mental imagery 
(and I will not assume for the purposes of this paper that it is, I am 
only making a conditional claim), then it is involuntary mental 
imagery that localizes in one’s egocentric space and that is accom-
panied by the feeling of presence — just like hallucination. Again, 
those who are not convinced that amodal completion is a form of 
mental imagery can just ignore the last couple of sentences. Maybe a 
bit less controversial is the kind of mental imagery that is involved in 
dreaming, which is also involuntary mental imagery that localizes in 
one’s egocentric space and that is accompanied by the feeling of 
presence — just like hallucination. 
It should be emphasized that the claim that hallucination is a form of 
mental imagery should not be particularly controversial either for the 
representationalist or for the relationalist. In fact, the relationalist 
should find this proposal a natural one (and some of them clearly do 
so — see Allen, 2015): according to the relationalist, one thing that 
hallucination and other uses of mental imagery have in common is 
that there is no perceived object that would partially constitute the 
perceptual state. So far, the relationalist (and the disjunctivist) should 
be happy with everything I have said. 
4. Perception and Mental Imagery 
If, as I argued, hallucination is a form of mental imagery, then the 
question about disjunctivism and the relation between perception and 
hallucination becomes a question about the relation between per-
ception and mental imagery — something we know a lot about. 
Again, disjunctivists deny that perception and hallucination have 
anything substantial in common. They point at what they see as a 
major dissimilarity: perception is partly constituted by the actual 
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perceived object, whereas hallucination clearly isn’t, given that there 
is no perceived object involved (that’s why it is an hallucination). And 
representationalists want to emphasize the similarities between per-
ception and hallucination: they have the same (or similar) representa-
tional content, it’s just that in the case of veridical perception this 
representation is correct, whereas in the case of hallucination it is 
incorrect. 
If we now translate this disagreement to the relation between per-
ception and mental imagery, the question becomes whether perception 
and mental imagery have anything substantial in common or whether 
they are radically different. There are some undeniable similarities. 
First, there is an almost complete overlap between the brain regions 
involved in perception and the brain regions involved in mental 
imagery, which suggests that the mental processes that make per-
ception possible are the very same mental processes that make mental 
imagery possible (see, for example, Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis, 
2006). Further, the patterns of cortical activation are also similar in 
perception and mental imagery (Page, Duhamel and Crognale, 2011).6 
Second, another important set of experimental findings in this con-
text is about our eye movements during visual imagery and visual per-
ception (I will focus on the visual sense modality for ease of expo-
sition, but we have very similar phenomena in the olfactory sense 
modality — see Bensafi et al., 2003 — and in audition — see 
Reisberg, 1992): our eye movements during visual imagery re-enact 
those of the perception of the same visual scene. When we visualize a 
scene, our spontaneous eye movements reflect the content of the 
visual scene (Brandt and Stark, 1997; Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002; 
Mast and Kosslyn, 2002; Spivey and Geng, 2001; Johansson, 
Holsanova and Holmqvist, 2006; Altmann, 2004; see also Laeng et 
al., 2014, for a good summary). For example, when we perceive a 
pattern in a grid, our eye movements are isomorphic to our eye move-
ments when we visualize the same pattern. But these findings are not 
limited to the similarities of eye movements when it comes to the 
perceived and visualized shape properties. The dilation of the pupil 
                                                          
6  It is important to keep apart the question about the similarity between mental imagery 
and perception from the grand ‘Imagery Debate’ of the 1980s (see Tye, 1991, for a 
summary). More specifically, admitting that there are important similarities between 
mental imagery and perception (in terms of physiology, of behaviour, or of phenomen-
ology) does not commit one to deny that mental imagery is propositional (as long as 
one, like Pylyshyn, 2007, also holds that perception is propositional as well). 
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also reflects the brightness or darkness of the imagined scene (Laeng 
and Sulutvedt, 2014). I will come back to this set of empirical findings 
in the next section. 
Third, there is a significant phenomenal similarity between con-
scious perception and conscious mental imagery — visualizing and 
seeing a yellow banana both have a yellow-ish phenomenal character, 
to put it very bluntly. Some philosophers and psychologists make 
more out of this phenomenal similarity with the help of the Perky 
experiments, where some subjects mistake their mental imagery for 
veridical perception (Perky, 1910; Segal, 1972; see also Hopkins, 
2012; Nanay, 2012, for a recent debate about what these experiments 
in fact show). 
But neither of these similarities between perception and mental 
imagery is decisive. The disjunctivist could dismiss these as super-
ficial similarities (that is, in fact, what Martin, 2004, says about 
phenomenal similarities in general). The disjunctivist can maintain 
that the general structure of perception and mental imagery are 
radically different, in spite of the fact that they give rise to similar 
phenomenology. And this is indeed the very ingenious disjunctivist 
move about mental imagery: the Dependency Thesis (Martin, 2002; 
see also Noordhof, 2002; Gregory, 2010; 2014, for analysis — the 
proposal itself goes back to Peacocke, 1985). The Dependency Thesis 
is the view that visualizing x consists of representing the seeing of x. 
The basic idea is that it is not the similarity between the content of 
seeing and visualizing that explains why seeing and visualizing are 
phenomenally similar. Rather, by representing it, mental imagery 
inherits the phenomenal properties of seeing x (Martin, 2002, p. 406; 
Smith, 2006, pp. 53–4). 
I will not argue against the Dependency Thesis here (but see Nanay, 
2015a, and Noordhof, 2002; Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002; Gregory, 
2010). The most straightforward alternative to the Dependency Thesis 
is to argue that the similarity between perception and mental imagery 
is indeed substantial inasmuch as perceptual content and the content of 
mental imagery are very similar (and maybe identical). 
Any such ‘similar content view’ would need to specify what it 
means by perceptual content and by the content of mental imagery and 
there is no great consensus on either of these questions. My own view, 
which can be plugged in here nicely, is that perceptual content and the 
content of mental imagery are exactly the same: both involve the 
spatial attribution of properties to objects (the perceived object or the 
imagined object). And, in both cases, shifting one’s attention changes 
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the determinacy of these attributed properties: attending to the colour 
of the perceived apple and not to its size makes (or tries to make) the 
attributed colour property more determinate (Nanay, 2010a). And 
attending to the colour of the imagined apple and not to its size makes 
(or tries to make) the attributed colour property more determinate. 
The only difference according to my account of the relation between 
perceptual content and the content of mental imagery is where this 
extra determinacy comes from. In the case of perception, it comes in a 
bottom-up manner: the extra determinacy is there in the sensory 
stimulus. In the case of mental imagery, there is no (corresponding) 
sensory stimulus, so it comes in a top-down manner from our back-
ground beliefs, memories, and expectations.7 
There are many wrinkles to be ironed out — see Nanay (2015a) for 
a full exposition of this account of the similarity between perceptual 
content and the content of mental imagery. If we accept this way of 
thinking about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery, 
then we have a direct route to argue against disjunctivism: the content 
of mental imagery and perceptual content are very similar — this is a 
substantial structural similarity between these two kinds of mental 
states, not a mere superficial one, like the phenomenal similarity 
between the two. But if there is a substantial common denominator 
(i.e. representational content) between perception and mental imagery 
and if hallucination is a form of mental imagery, then there is also a 
substantial common denominator between perception and hallucina-
tion, namely, representational content, just as the anti-disjunctivist 
representationalist originally claimed. 
5. Eye Movements 
Of course, not everyone will accept my account of the similarity 
between the content of perception and mental imagery. Those who 
deny that perceptual states have content will, for example, obviously 
reject it. And they are the ones who tend to push for disjunctivism. 
But it is important to see how my strategy generalizes. Any version of 
the similar content view (see Noordhof, 2002) can be plugged into this 
argument. As long as the content of mental imagery and perceptual 
content are similar and hallucination is a form of mental imagery, we 
                                                          
7  There are, of course, mixed cases, where the extra determinacy comes partly in a top-
down and partly in a bottom-up manner (Nanay, 2013; 2015a). 
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can conclude that there is a substantial common denominator between 
hallucination and perception — namely, that their representational 
content is similar. But the staunch anti-representationalist will still be 
unmoved, as any version of the similar content view by definition pre-
supposes that perceptual states have content (which is similar to the 
content of mental imagery, thus, of hallucination). And one of the 
main motivations for disjunctivism was that it is consistent with the 
view that perceptual states have no content. 
But even the Dependency Thesis needs to be able to explain the sets 
of empirical findings about the similarities between perception and 
mental imagery. The most important of these for my argument are the 
ones about eye movements. As we have seen, when we visualize a 
scene, our spontaneous eye movements reflect the content of the 
visual scene (Brandt and Stark, 1997; Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002; 
Mast and Kosslyn, 2002; Spivey and Geng, 2001; Johansson, 
Holsanova and Holmqvist, 2006; Altmann, 2004; see also Laeng et 
al., 2014, for a good summary). 
One may worry whether these findings are consistent with the 
Dependency Thesis at all (Nanay, 2015a). But even if they are, the 
Dependency Thesis needs to be supplemented with an account of why 
mental imagery leads to eye movements that are very similar to the 
eye movements that constitute the veridical perception of the same 
scene. According to the Dependency Thesis, visualizing x consists of 
imagining (that is, representing) seeing x. Seeing x, as we have seen, 
must involve eye movements. However, according to the Dependency 
Thesis, visualizing x consists of imagining (that is, representing) 
seeing x. But representing is not something that would involve 
specific eye movements. In fact, most often, it doesn’t. It is the con-
tent of this representation, that is, the seeing of x, that involves eye 
movements. Why is it, then, that the vehicle of this representation 
requires identical eye movements to the ones the content of this 
representation requires? 
My aim here is not to argue against the Dependency Thesis. My aim 
is to point out that the proponents of the Dependency Thesis need to 
give an explanation for why the vehicle of mental imagery requires 
identical eye movements to the ones the content of this mental 
imagery (the seeing) requires. And this explanation will need to talk 
about some important similarity between mental imagery (which, for 
the proponent of the Dependency Thesis, is the representation of 
seeing) and the perceptual state itself. When it comes to their guiding 
eye movements, they are similar. 
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It would still be open for the proponents of the Dependency Thesis 
to deploy the standard disjunctivist strategy of denying that this simi-
larity is a substantial similarity — they could still say that it is a super-
ficial similarity of the kind that phenomenal similarity provides. But 
this route doesn’t seem very promising given what we know about the 
role of eye movements in perception and in mental imagery. Very 
briefly, eye movements are necessary both for visual perception and 
for mental imagery. This has been known about perception for a very 
long time. Eye movement is not an optional feature of visual per-
ception. If the sensory stimulation on our retina does not change (if we 
have what is called a ‘stabilized retinal image’), then we cease to see 
anything whatsoever (see Heckenmueller, 1965, for a classic over-
view). In general, it is an important feature of visual perception that if 
the retinal image remains the same even for a short time, we cease to 
have any visual experience. We can have visual experiences only if 
our retinal image changes continuously — normally as a result of the 
saccades and micro-saccades of the eye (see Findlay and Gilchrist, 
2003, for an excellent summary). If this is true, however, then one 
cannot be in a perceptual state if one’s retinal image is stabilized. 
Thus, eye movement is a necessary feature of experiencing anything 
visually. And eye movement is also a necessary feature of forming 
any mental imagery: if subjects are asked not to move their eyes 
during visualizing, they have difficulties imagining the scene, and if 
they can do so, they attribute only very rudimentary features to the 
imagined object (Laeng and Teodorescu, 2002; see also Mast and 
Kosslyn, 2002). 
Importantly, eye movements do not merely serve as an enabling 
cause for perception and imagery. As the disjunctivist would be quick 
to point out, just because perception and imagery share a feature that 
is necessary for both, this does not mean that they have anything 
‘fundamental’ in common (again, I’ll bracket my own worries about 
how coherent one can be about what counts as ‘fundamental’ without 
endorsing unsavoury essentialist assumptions, see Nanay, 2015b). 
Here is another feature that perception and imagery share and that is 
necessary for both: a sufficiently high amount of oxygen in the sub-
ject’s blood stream. This does not make the amount of oxygen in the 
subject’s blood stream a ‘fundamental’ common denominator between 
perception and imagery that would disprove disjunctivism. The differ-
ence between eye movements and the amount of oxygen in one’s 
blood stream is that the latter is a mere enabling cause of perception 
and imagery, whereas the former is constitutive of perception and 
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mental imagery. As the experiments I talked about in the last para-
graph show, eye movements make the mental imagery of a triangle be 
what it is — if we change the eye movements, the mental imagery will 
no longer be of a triangle. So those who deny that perception has 
content need to acknowledge that whatever makes our eyes move in a 
certain way in the case of both the perception of a scene and the 
mental imagery of the same scene is something that perception and 
imagery share and that is not merely an enabling cause but rather 
something that makes these states be what they are. In other words, 
similarity of eye movement cannot be dismissed as a superficial 
similarity between perception and mental imagery. 
6. Conclusion 
We have found a substantial common denominator between per-
ception and mental imagery, even according to the Dependency Thesis 
account. If it is true that hallucination is a form of mental imagery, it 
follows that there is a substantial common denominator between 
perception and hallucination as well. But this substantial common 
denominator between perception and hallucination is exactly what 
disjunctivism denies. If we consider hallucination to be a form of 
mental imagery, we have very strong reasons to doubt the truth of 
disjunctivism. 
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